THCB

Categories

Tag: The ACA

Looking at Healthcare Through Payer Lenses

• 11

By JOHN MOORE

Payers, as with the rest of the healthcare industry, have a lot on their plate right now. Healthcare reform, via the Affordable Care Act (ACA) continues its march forward despite legal and political uncertainty. Struggling to define the payer role in Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), understanding the impact of Health Insurance Exchanges (HIXs) on their business (McKinsey survey results likely have many payers wondering how to market to what may be an enormous uptick in individual purchasers of coverage – something that most are ill-prepared for), and how to better engage consumers/members in proactively managing their health are a few of the top issues that were addressed at the AHIP Institute last week.

But when one sits back and reflects on the AHIP Institute – all of the sessions, all the discussions, the chatter in the halls, underlying messages within the message, the exhibit hall – it boils down to three key themes that this sector of the healthcare industry is grappling with, which much like the three stages of meaningful use, build upon one another:Continue reading…

Essential Health Benefits: The Secretary’s Joystick

• 3

By Robert Graboyes

Beginning in 2014, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) hands the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services a joystick – the Essential Health Benefits (EHB) package – with the potential to rocket small-business health insurance premiums skyward. EHB is the menu of goods and services that must be covered under all exchange-purchased insurance plans and non-grandfathered small-group and individual insurance plans. By vesting one set of hands with control over EHB, small business faces permanent administrative uncertainty. At the same time, the brunt of EHB appears largely to bypass big business, unions, and governments.

The EHB requirements apply to policies purchased both in exchanges and in non-exchange small-group or individual markets. In the small-group and individual markets, annual or lifetime coverage limits on all EHB items are forbidden. And plans must have an actuarial value (AV) of at least 60 percent, meaning the plan’s total reimbursements must be at least 60 percent of the total qualifying health care costs incurred.

Section 1302 empowers the Secretary of HHS to define EHB, but gives little specificity beyond requiring that EHB include 10 general categories (e.g., ambulatory patient services) and “the items and services covered within the categories;” the Secretary is to also assure that EHB includes “benefits typically covered” by a “typical employer plan.” The meaning of these words in quotation marks is left to the Secretary (and future Secretaries) to define and redefine. The fluid definitions and concentrated discretion mean uncertainty, which carries a financial cost for small business.
Continue reading…

Another Legal Round – With a Major Misstep?

• 10

By ROGER COLLIER

The appellate court hearing in Atlanta a week ago on the Affordable Care Act’s constitutionality, one of a series along the inevitable road to the Supreme Court, showed that the opposing legal arguments are beginning to be firmly established—with each seeming to confuse the purchase of health insurance with the purchase of health care.

The Atlanta panel of three judges, with both Republican and Democratic appointees, heard arguments for and against the earlier ruling by Judge Roger Vinson in Pensacola that the individual mandate was unconstitutional and so central to the ACA that the entire act should be invalidated, and specifically that while the Commerce Clause of the Constitution gave the government authority to regulate interstate commerce, it did not allow Congress to penalize people for the “inactivity” of declining to buy a commercial product.

Former Bush administration Solicitor General Paul Clement, arguing in support of the Vinson decision, agreed that while it could be permissible for Congress to require insurance or other payment by those being treated in an emergency room, because they would already be in the “stream of commerce,” it was a very different matter to require them to pay prospectively for future care.

 

Continue reading…

Lost in the Mckinsey mire

• 1

It’s a good week for Bob Kocher, a key architect of the ACA, to be leaving Mckinsey and moving into the word of venture capital. There’s lots of fuss in wonkdom about whether Mckinsey’s survey of employers was statistically correct and peer reviewed or more of a push poll. There’s lots of fuss even apparently within the firm about the validity of the estimate that 30% of employers (or is it employees) will be moved over to the exchanges. But despite ballyhoo over the Mckinsey report, because in 2009 the White House got stuck into the mantra that “if you like your insurance you can keep it” the fact that it’s good to get employers out of providing health insurance has been missed. If you have insurance from an employer that puts you in the exchange it’s a fair bet that your coverage was anyway going to move to levels worse than that mandated by the government. And the levels of coverage and behavior of the plans in the exchange which will hopefully actually be enforced–with the threat of being booted out being a motivator. And as we all know employers are the worst purchasers of health care out there and need to be got out of the game. That was what the very sensible Wyden-Bennet plan did, but as the collective stupidity of the nation’s unions and chambers  of commerce is very high, we ended up with the ACA instead. Oh well, welcome to America.

It’s All Going According to Plan

• 75

By JONATHAN HALVORSON

Most people regard health care reform in America as thoroughly bungled. The proverbial train left the station weak and wheezing, was pushed off the rails by hooligans and is about to crumple in an inglorious heap in the ditch. Only about 20% say the reform hits the sweet spot, with the rest convinced it went too far or didn’t go far enough.

To review the most recent pilings-on: in a time of huge Federal deficits, we get depressing predictions that the PPACA will do little or nothing to slow the growth of health care costs. Only a year after passage of what was supposed to be comprehensive reform, Democrats acknowledge that Medicare and Medicaid spending remain out of control and propose new cuts in the hundreds of billions. In the span of four months, Republicans switched from posing as aggrieved defenders of Medicare spending, to proposing to slash it and leave seniors to absorb the spillover. Medicaid funding is probably even more precarious, since fewer Medicaid recipients vote.

To add injury to injury, the Supreme court may rule to invalidate the entire law, or perhaps just the mandate to purchase insurance, thereby removing the most hated part of the law, but eliminating the “universal” part of universal coverage and inviting an actuarial death spiral. Oh, and the few reforms that look like they might bring costs down, like the IPAB board in Medicare and the minimum medical expense ratio for insurers, are under threat of being watered down. A year after legislation has been passed that will transform nearly a fifth of the American economy, to the casual observer it looks like nothing much has happened and nothing in the future is secure, especially anything that the big industry players don’t like.

In light of this and more, pessimism is understandable, but what we are witnessing in these turns of events is not mere politically-driven chaos. There is good reason to think that events are unfolding more or less in line with a staged strategy for deep reform that emerged out of the experience in Massachusetts. The strategy is essentially this: enact universal coverage first to precipitate a sense of crisis. This will lead to deep reform on the problem that exacerbates all other problems: the cost of health care. Readers of this blog need little reminding that these costs are twice as high as in any other nation.Continue reading…

Single Payer in Vermont? Well, Not Exactly

• 1

By ROGER COLLIER

In just a few days, Vermont’s Governor Peter Shumlin will sign into law what the media is calling “single payer health care reform.” But is it?

Vermont has certainly demonstrated more enthusiasm for a single payer approach than any other state. The Governor and key Democratic legislators have supported the concept, the state has a well-organized lobbying group in Vermont for Single Payer, and a state-funded study earlier this year estimated that a single payer approach could dramatically reduce health care costs. The major result has been passage in the past month by both of the state’s legislative chambers of the bill that Governor Shumlin indicates that he will sign.

So does this mean that Vermont is ready to upend its existing health care financing system and replace it with a French or British-style system? Not exactly.

The versions of the bill passed by Vermont’s House and Senate are each far, far more tentative than committed single payer advocates would wish, and have already been subject to scathing criticism by national single payer advocates. The bill provides for the creation of the legal framework of a public insurance program, to be called Green Mountain Care, but includes no funding mechanism, defines no benefit standards, is vague on the future roles of private insurers, and is silent on exactly how existing federal programs are to be incorporated.

What the bill does do is to establish the state exchange required by the Accountable Care Act, encourage experimental capitated payment structures, and create a Board for Green Mountain Care with responsibility for examining funding, benefit, and other issues, with recommendations to be submitted to the state legislature in 2013.Continue reading…

Summary of CMS Proposed Rule on Accountable Care Organizations

• 1

By JORDAN T. COHEN

(Second in a series. See Part 1.)

CMS recently released the proposed rule that will regulate PPACA’s Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). The MSSP relies on the accountable care organization (ACO) model in order to generate and distribute savings. HealthReformWatch.com has discussed the general framework for ACOs before. Clocking in at nearly 500 hundred pages, the proposed rule helps to flesh out what was largely a philosophical exercise in cooperative health care delivery. Below are what I believe to be a number of key pieces of the proposed rule.

Proposed Rule Highlights

The 2 ACO Models – (425.7)

There will be two ACO models. The choice between models appears to be largely geared towards minimizing ACO risk while hospitals and providers are first bringing their ACOs online.

  • One-Sided Model: A one-sided ACO shares in the savings, but is not on the hook to share in any of the losses (i.e., costs surpassing the ACO’s benchmark as determined by CMS, see below).
  • Two-Sided Model: A two-sided ACO shares in both the savings as well as the losses.

Basic Time frame and Structure

Not surprisingly, ACO hopefuls must form an agreement with CMS directly. ACOs under the MSSP must last for not less than three years after the application has been approved. (425.18).  The performance period will be 12 months. The ACO must have at least 5,000 beneficiaries, and must include a sufficient number of primary care physicians to treat the ACO beneficiary population.Continue reading…

The Massachusetts Mistake

• 17

By ROGER COLLIER

A year after the passage of health care reform, fewer than half of Americans support it, a similar percentage believe that it has already been found unconstitutional or soon will be, health care costs are continuing to rise far faster than the CPI, and the Republican Party has seized on the issue as a sure election winner.

The Obama administration and congressional Democrats, now thoroughly on the defensive, are clearly surprised at the public and political reaction. But should they be? This post—on the reliance on Massachusetts as a model—is the first of three that will look at some of the miscalculations—and sheer bad luck—that have helped to undermine reform. When Governor Mitt Romney signed Massachusetts’ reform bill into law in 2006, it was widely regarded as a bipartisan political triumph, and one that was supported by the public and by most of the state’s insurers and providers. Massachusetts would be the first state to require virtually all legal residents to have coverage (with tax penalties imposed on those not complying), while providing subsidies for lower-income individuals not eligible for government programs, as well as to implement a state-administered brokerage function (the Connector) to allow competitive selection of health plans. By the fall of 2008, as congressional efforts to design national health care reform moved into overdrive with the election of Barack Obama, the Massachusetts legislation was widely regarded as a success. Public reactions were generally positive, the numbers of uninsured had fallen, and there had been no dramatic increase in costs. It was scarcely surprising that the Massachusetts model emerged from the field of competing proposals as the favorite of most Democratic lawmakers.

Unfortunately, the elected officials in Washington DC failed to recognize that Massachusetts was an exceptional state in terms of health care. Even before the state’s reform bill was enacted, the percentage of uninsured was very low. It was also a socially very liberal state, far more likely than most to support reform efforts (in fact, Massachusetts had passed, but then revoked, a slightly different version of health care reform a dozen years earlier). And, of course, the economy was still in its boom period when the new law was passed. Massachusetts had other advantages that would not transfer to national reform. As a small state, with only a small percentage of the population likely to be directly affected by reform, implementation could be much faster—less than a year for most provisions of the state’s new law. Continue reading…

Medical Loss Ratio: Putting Percentages and Politics Aside

• 2

By CONNIE HARVEY

The Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) policy written into the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) requires health insurance companies to deliver more direct value to consumers by mandating that they spend a higher percentage of premium dollars collected on medical care, as opposed to administrative costs.

The new law requires that at least 85 percent of all premium dollars collected by insurance companies for large employer plans be spent on healthcare services and quality improvement. For plans sold to individuals and small employers, at least 80 percent of the premium must be spent on benefits and quality improvement. If insurance companies do not meet these goals because of administrative costs or high profits, they must provide rebates to consumers starting in 2012.

While much debate exists on if this is requirement is “fair,” those on both side of the argument can agree that any reduction in administrative costs is a step in the right direction, especially if it frees up dollars to be spent in areas that will directly impact members. Moving beyond politics and percentages, payers can save up to 30-50 percent in operating costs when working with a partner to streamline back office processes. Examples include:

  • Claims processing, billing and provider maintenance: By outsourcing standard transactional services, payers can increase data quality and accelerate turnaround time on claims processing and lower costs.
  • Enrollment processing: Payers can turn to partners to handle standard enrollment functions including setting up new member accounts, staffing call centers for member questions and issuing satisfaction surveys.
  • Auditing solutions: Recovering funds from incorrectly paid claims is a service payers can outsource that can recoup funds by having an outsourcing partner track and even litigate wrongful payment claims on an insurance company’s behalf.
  • Customer care: Using a partner to help communicate plan information and answer questions from members allows payers to focus on quality of care and new product introduction, while reducing costs and complying with regulatory demands.Continue reading…

Medical Loss Ratios – Again!

• 4

By ROGER COLLIER

A new study, reported in the American Journal of Managed Care, seems likely to add more heat to the continuing medical loss ratio controversy.

The Accountable Care Act effectively mandates that health insurers achieve MLRs of 85 percent for large group business and 80 percent for small group and individual business, with insurers not meeting these thresholds required to make rebates to affected policyholders. However, the ACA allows HHS to issue a waiver if the requirement would disrupt a state’s insurance market. So far, an individual coverage waiver has been granted to the State of Maine, with eight other states’ waiver requests being considered. The study reported by AJMC examined individual coverage data from health insurer filings to state regulators, as reported to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. For each state (except California, where most health insurers report to a state agency other than the Insurance Commissioner), the study computed the number of individuals with coverage (in terms of enrollee-years), the number of insurers offering coverage, and the medical loss ratios (recomputed to reflect differences between ACA’s definition of MLR and that used by the NAIC).

Based on this data, the study went on to estimate the number of enrollees in plans failing the ACA’s 80 percent threshold, and the number of higher-risk individuals who might have difficulty in finding coverage if their insurer exited the market. At first sight, the findings seem dramatic and very different from the expectations of the MLR provision’s Senate authors. The AJMC article estimates that in nine states (Arkansas, Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Wyoming, and West Virginia) at least half of the individual health insurers missed the 80 percent threshold in 2009, while in twelve states (Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, New Hampshire, Nevada, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia) more than half of the enrollees were covered by insurers failing the standard, with some two million individuals nationally covered by such insurers. The study then projected that overall more than a hundred thousand enrollees (with more than ten thousand in each of Florida, Illinois, Texas, and Virginia) would find it difficult or impossible to find coverage if their non-MLR-compliant insurers exited the market. If the study’s findings are accurate, somewhere between a dozen and twenty states could reasonably demand waivers of the individual market MLR standard.

However, as the authors note, there were significant study limitations as well as possible source data inaccuracies. Enrollment in health plans offered by life insurers was generally omitted, as was all data from California. Additionally, the findings are dependent on state reporting to the NAIC, something that some of the data shown in the article suggests may be unreliable. For example, Maine—the only state so far granted an MLR waiver—is shown as having an average MLR well above the 80 percent threshold, while insurers in Michigan are shown as having an average MLR in excess of 1.0 in both 2002 and 2009—an unlikely consistently money-losing trend in a large state. Continue reading…